how the war could have ended: Combined assault
After the war in Europe ended, American, British, and Russian forces were free to attack the island nation of Japan until submission. “Some senior naval and air force officers, including the Commanding Admiral of the United States Fleet, Admiral King, and the President’s representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Leahy, believed that Japan could be forced to accept our terms merely by our suffocating naval blockade and our devastating air assaults.”[1] To do so, they would need to secure bases near to and around Japan thus forcing Japan to give up before land battles even commenced. This would happen even if Russia refused to enter the war in Japan. “The reflections made it easier for them to along with plans for this venture. Enlarging naval and air attacks were to be continued anyway, to break down resistance to the invasion; these might be so damaging that Japan would quit before great scheduled land battles were fought. And, in any case, the losses suffered in the air and naval services would be less.”[2] However, Japan’s surrender was not of absolute certainty. For all we know, they could have fought harder than ever with the troops so close to home and they may have emerged victorios. To prevent this, MacArthur wanted to attack the heart of Japan to give them a greater advantage. On May 25, less than three weeks since the war had ended in Germany, the Joint Cheifs dispatched a formal directive to MacArthur, Nimitz and Arnold.
“The Joint Chief of Staff Direct the invasion of Kyushu (operation OLYMPIC) target date 1 November 1945, in order to:
1. Intensify the blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan
2. Contain and destroy major enemy forces
3. Support further advances for the purpose of establishing the conditions favorable to the decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan.”[3]
The President was hesitant and wished to discuss it more after his talk with Churchill and Stalin which was scheduled for the middle of July. This may have been because he found it to be too bold and not very sound in judgment. He was concerned about the number of lives and ships would be required for the battle. “It is his [the President’s] intention,” Leahy informed the Chiefs of Staff on June 14th, “To make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing o the maximum extent possible to loss of American lives.”[4]
[1] Fleet Admiral King, by Admiral Ernest J. King and W.M Whitehill, page 605, and William D Leahy, I Was There, pages 384-385
[2] Japan Subdues The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific, by Herbert Feis, page 5
[3] Japan Subdues The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific, by Herbert Feis, page 7
[4] Japan Subdues The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific, by Herbert Feis, page 8
“The Joint Chief of Staff Direct the invasion of Kyushu (operation OLYMPIC) target date 1 November 1945, in order to:
1. Intensify the blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan
2. Contain and destroy major enemy forces
3. Support further advances for the purpose of establishing the conditions favorable to the decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan.”[3]
The President was hesitant and wished to discuss it more after his talk with Churchill and Stalin which was scheduled for the middle of July. This may have been because he found it to be too bold and not very sound in judgment. He was concerned about the number of lives and ships would be required for the battle. “It is his [the President’s] intention,” Leahy informed the Chiefs of Staff on June 14th, “To make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing o the maximum extent possible to loss of American lives.”[4]
[1] Fleet Admiral King, by Admiral Ernest J. King and W.M Whitehill, page 605, and William D Leahy, I Was There, pages 384-385
[2] Japan Subdues The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific, by Herbert Feis, page 5
[3] Japan Subdues The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific, by Herbert Feis, page 7
[4] Japan Subdues The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific, by Herbert Feis, page 8